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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2576
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0263
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1242
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 013578

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [ID](#)

SUBJECT: PDAS WARLICK'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN DEFENSE
OFFICIAL ON PEACEKEEPING

Classified By: Stanley J. Harsha, Acting Political Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (C) Summary: IO PDAS James Warlick discussed Indonesian peacekeeping policy and options with Indonesian Director General for Defense Strategy Dadi Susanto in Jakarta on December 19. Susanto said the UNIFIL deployment to Lebanon was Indonesia's first involving mechanized infantry. Indonesia was not considering a further deployment but could mobilize another battalion if necessary, logistical and budgetary limitations permitting. GOI would review Indonesia's UNIFIL participation if it lasted more than one year. Indonesia was not anticipating other UN requests during this time but would consider them, including for observers, and could deploy police observers. Indonesia would be willing to send peacekeepers to Iraq as part of a UN operation, in line with President Yudhoyono's proposal at the time of President Bush's visit. End summary.

UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT

¶2. (C) In their meeting at the Indonesian Department of Defense, Susanto said Indonesia's participation in the UN and UN peacekeeping efforts was rooted in the Indonesian constitution, which encouraged Indonesia to participate actively in world affairs. Indonesia had deployed many peacekeeping contingents in the past half-century, but the UNIFIL deployment was the first deployment of mechanized infantry, though the majority of the force was non-mechanized. This deployment was logistically more complex. Indonesia did not expect to commit more peacekeepers to Lebanon for the time being and would have to review the UNIFIL deployment if it lasted beyond one year. One further infantry battalion could be mobilized if necessary, although logistical and budgetary limitations had to be taken into account.

FURTHER RESOURCES

¶3. (C) Indonesia was not looking for additional UN PKO opportunities at this time but would consider UN requests, Susanto said. The UNIFIL deployment was a successful precedent for such deployments in the future. Indonesia might be able to send observers if it could not send troops, and currently had about a dozen military observers in Darfur, Sudan. Logistical limitations aside, Indonesia had additional troops available for PKO and had considerable experience in peacekeeping. The "territorial" structure of Indonesia's military meant that it had few dedicated bases from which to draw troops, which were scattered throughout the country in small units embedded in local communities. Warlick noted the UNSC was considering deploying peacekeepers to Chad, across the border from Darfur.

¶4. (C) Susanto said Indonesia had also sent police peacekeepers in the past -- to Namibia, for example -- and could do so again. If the UN requested, Indonesia would consider sending observers to other regions, such as Haiti.

IRAQ

¶5. (C) In the case of Iraq, Susanto stated, Indonesia would consider sending peacekeepers provided they were part of a UN operation. (Note: During the visit of President Bush to Indonesia in November, Indonesian President Yudhoyono proposed the creation of an international peacekeeping force led by Islamic countries under the auspices of the UN as part of a larger effort to pacify and rebuild Iraq.) Indonesia had no specific interests at stake in Iraq, considered itself neutral in the conflict even if it was predominantly Muslim, and had good relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.
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